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Under the Tennessee Code a will valid at the place of execution is
valid under the laws of Tennessee.1 A testator domiciled in Tennessee
executed a will in Mississippi in the presence of two witnesses, but
thinking that the will should be acknowledged by a notary public
rather than subscribed by the witnesses, he had the acknowledgment
taken by a Mississippi notary public. As the Mississippi statute is
peculiar in that it merely requires "that the Will shall be attested
by two or more credible witnesses" rather than the usual "shall be
both attested and subscribed" the court held that the will was properly
admitted to probate in Tennessee since the less rigid Mississippi re-
quirements had been fulfilled.
2
Deeds as Wills:
It is well settled that an instrument in the form of a deed may be
admitted to probate as the will of the grantor if it was signed and
properly attested and subscribed by at least two witnesses, and if
the grantor intended it to become operative only upon his death.3 Thus
a deed granting "Blackacre to A from and after my death" may be
admitted to probate. In Howell v. Davis4 H and W were tenants by
the entirety of certain real property. W executed a warranty deed
to her husband expressly reserving a life estate. The deed specified
"said conveyance to take effect at the death" of W. The deed was ac-
cepted and recorded. Subsequently, H died and W thereafter at-
tempted to convey the land, again reserving a life estate. This latter
conveyance was held a nullity as she had in fact no transferable in-
terest beyond her life estate.
Whether a deed is effective to convey presently a future interest de-
pends upon the intention of the grantor. The reservation of a life
estate clearly shows an intent to accomplish presently an immediate
shift in the title and practically all the cases so hold. Such reservation
in the Davis case was either meaningless or compelled this conclusion
and while the statement that the conveyance was "to take effect at
death" points the other way, it is consistent with a present transfer
Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8098.7 (Williams Supp. 1952).
2. Ragsdale v. Hill, 269 S.W.2d 911 (Term. App. M.S. 1954).
3. ATKINSON, WILLS 188 (1953).
4. 268 S.W.2d 85 (Tenn. 1954).
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since it could refer equally well to the time of the change in pos-
session and enjoyment. Thus while it is possible to construe a deed
as a will the courts properly lean heavily in favor of an interpreta-
tion that an inter vivos rather than a testamentary transfer was
intended.5
Revocation of Wills.by Operation of Law:
At common law the only change in the circumstances of a testator
deemed sufficient to revoke his will was marriage plus birth of issue.0
As divorces were almost unknown no authority existed as to the
effect on a will of the termination of the marriage by divorce. While
legal separations were not uncommon, it was never held that a ju-
dicial separation, even when accompanied by property settlement,
effected a revocation of a bequest to a spouse. However, such a
separated spouse might forfeit his or her bequest, not because of the
separation, but because the terms of the separation agreement might
be construed to release her rights.7 This construction would seem to
be justified wherever the agreement indicated that the property trans-
ferred was in satisfaction of her inheritable interest. In Price v. Price,8
the Tennessee court followed the general rule that no implied revoca-
tion results because of a legal separation even though accompanied
by a property settlement. Whether the particular property settle-
ment satisfied the bequest to the spouse was not decided since the
issue arose on the probate of the will.
All courts have been extremely hesitant to read into the statute
dealing with revocation any new exceptions to the rule that wills
may be revoked only by burning, tearing, cancelling, obliterating or
otherwise destroying, or by an instrument of equal dignity with a
will. In the absence of an express statutory provision divorce alone
does not work a revocation, but where the divorce is accompanied by
a property settlement, many courts have recognized that after such
a change in circumstances it is even less likely than under the com-
mon-law exception, i.e., marriage plus birth of issue, that testators
would desire their wills be continued in effect.
. The Tennessee Supreme Court adopted this view in Rankin v. Mc-
Dearmon.9 It should be noted that it is not a question of the particular
testator's intent. Divorce plus property settlement conclusively re-
vokes a will even though the testator failed to use one of the more
traditional methods because he desired that his will should continue
to be operative.
5. ATKINSON, WILLS 183 (1953).
6. At common law a woman's will was revoked by subsequent marriage.
7. ATKmsoN, WILLs 432 (1953).
8. 269 S.W.2d 920 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954).
9. 270 S.W.2d 660 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953).
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Holographic Wills:
Our statute provides that no witnesses to a holographic will are
necessary but the signature and all material parts of the instrument
must be in the handwriting of the testator and his handwriting must
be proved by two witnesses. 10 The difficult problem presented by
holographs is whether the writing was intended as a last will and
testament. Courts have been extremely hesitant to admit letters and
other papers expressing vague testamentary intentions. A letter tell-
ing Cousin John that Blackacre is to be his when the writer dies
smacks more of diplomatic double talk than a solemn testamentary
devise. On the other hand such a letter from a convicted felon facing
execution within forty-eight hours should be admitted to probate
without difficulty. In Davidson v. Gilreath" the testatrix copied the
form of her brother's typewritten will even to the attestation clause,
leaving blank spaces for the signatures of the witnesses. While the
document was wholly in her handwriting, the court found a lack
of the necessary intent since she failed to accomplish all the steps
that she indicated she intended to accomplish before the document was
to be complete. The provision for witnesses manifested, the court
found, that she intended the attestation and subscription by witnesses
was to take place before the document would become operative. Her
failure to obtain witnesses, after providing for them, showed that the
expressions of her wishes still remained in tentative form. 2
In sharp contrast to this holding is Nicley v. Nicley, 3 where the
court held that the testator's name in a holograph need not appear
at the conclusion of the document but will suffice if the document
shows his name was subscribed in the body of the will. Of course it
must be subscribed with the intention that it shall operate to fulfill the
signing requirement. Generally the signature in the opening para-
graph is intended to be merely descriptive of the writer. But evidence
of the testator's declarations indicated that in her mind she had com-
pleted her testament and of course she may adopt as her signature
her name as she had written it in another part of the instrument.
4
10. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8098.5 (Williams Supp. 1952).
11. 273 S.W.2d 717 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1954).
12. Compare cases where the testator's signature is incomplete. If T starts
to write his name and his strength fails after he has partially completed it,
the part written will not serve as his signature. He must have completed the
entire act he contemplated as the authenticating act of signing. Thus in
In re Male, [1934] V.L.R. 318, T, whose name was Rebecca Male, began to
write but had only made a mark which appeared to be the letter "R"
when she stopped and said "I cannot do any more." The will was denied
probate. On the other hand it is well settled that any mark may serve as a
signing, and if she had intended to make an "R" as the authenticating mark,
the will would have been properly executed.
13. 276 S.W.2d 497 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1955).




Testators, in drafting holographic wills, usually say: if I die, rather
than when I die, and courts quite properly recognize this human failing.
In Baldwin v. Davidson 15 the document, quoted in full in footnote, 16
recited "should anything happen to me." It could have been con-
strued as an instrument intended to become operative during the
writer's life in the event of incapacity but the second last sentence
manifested a testamentary intent. After a sale of the business by one
Davidson, Sr., he was to "turn over to my sister my share to be dis-
tributed as she sees fit." The writer was clearly thinking of a period
beyond his death. This will raised a number of construction problems.
It referred to the sale of the decedent's partnership interest and de-
livery of the proceeds to his sister. As the business was incorporated
prior to his death, it was argued that the bequest was adeemed. But
the court properly held the change was a formal one. He intended to
give his interest in the business and so his stock, which represented
his old partnership interest in changed form, passed. Did the bequest
fail because the beneficiaries were indefinite? Was his sister required
to distribute the bequest to others? While the property was not in
terms given to her, she was given a general and unlimited power of
appointment over it and the court pointed out that she could acquire
it by exercising her power in favor of herself. It was, therefore,
properly held the bequest was in substance a gift of the property to
her. Particularly, in large estates, draftsmen ought to be careful to
spell out the intent of the testator. By using the traditional language
that from time immemorial has been used to create particular types
of estates, needless litigation and unnecessary taxes may be avoided.
In another case17 the testator devised and bequeathed his real and
personal property to his wife "for and during her natural life, to have
and enjoy in anyway she may deem proper, also she may sell or dis-
pose of any or all of my realty as she may desire." The wife trans-
ferred certain real estate by deed of gift. It was held on a construction
of the above clause that while the wife had the broadest authority to
sell and use the proceeds she had no power to give the real estate
15. 267 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1954).
16. "Sept. 16, 1948
"To Whom it May Concern:
"It is my wish & desire, because of a partnership between myself and
P. B. Tichenor & B. W. Davidson, Sr., that should any thing happen to me
to make it impossible to look after this business, that B. W. Davidson, Sr.
shall have the right to sign my name on checks-Deeds-or in any other
matter B. W. Davidson, Sr. shall have my complete power of attorney. This
is to keep the partnership complete until such time the partners shall sell
the property & Business. B. W. Davidson, Sr. shall turn over to my Sister
Mrs. 0. P. Brakefield my share to be distributed as she shall see fit. B. W.
Davidson, Sr. to act without bond."
(Signed) "J. D. Baldwin"
17. Black v. Pettigrew, 270 S.W.2d 196 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953).
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away. While it is difficult to argue with the result since it turns on
a determination of the intention of the testator as found from the
language used, cases restricting the power of invasion given widows
may cause estates to lose the benefit of the enlarged marital deduction
provision of the 1954 Code,18 unless will draftsmen spell out the equiv-
alent of a general power of appointment.
Under the 1954 Code a legal life estate in a spouse with an un-
restricted general power to appoint either by will or by deed qualifies
the property for the marital deduction. But a right to sell, "for her
needs" or "for her welfare," or "to dispose of as she may think
proper under the then existing circumstances," for example, place
limitations upon her power which would seem to defeat the marital de-
duction. Life estates with broad powers over the fee are extremely
common in Tennessee. Cases like the above indicate, where the surviv-
ing spouse is the life tenant, extreme care must be used to assure the
marital deduction, whenever it is desired by the testator.
INTESTATE SUCCESSION
Intestacy:
The failure of the legislature to abolish the common distinction
between real and personal property in our laws of descent and distri-
bution continues to cause unhappy results, particularly where widows
are concerned. In Moore v. Carter19 the mother of the intestate left
about one-third of her estate to the wife of a deceased son and about
two-thirds to her surviving son. She had told the son and his wife
that she was leaving them two-thirds in such a way that on the death
of either the other would own the property. Part of the son's share
consisted of two specific devises of real property. The son, who had
always enjoyed excellent health, died unexpectedly two days after
his mother. He left no will. He had no issue, no parent, no brother,
no sister, no issue of deceased brother or sister who survived him.
Under our statute of descent the land descended to the heirs of his
mother,2 0 his cousins. Had it been personal property his widow
would have been entitled to the entire fund. It seems inconceivable
that the decedent would have preferred his cousins to his wife or
that his mother ever contemplated such a possibility.
An attempt was made to work an estoppel based upon the mother's
18. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 2056(B) (5).
19. 277 S.W.2d 427 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1955).
20. "(3) (b) By parent from whom or whose ancestors estate came, when.-
If he have no brothers or sisters, then it shall be inherited by the parent, if
living, from whom or whose ancestors it came, in preference to the other
parent. "(c) By other parent, when.-If the transmitting parent be dead, the
other surviving parent shall take.
"c(d) By heirs of which parent, when.-If both parents be dead, then by
the heirs of the parent from whom or whose ancestor it came." TENN. CODE
ANw. § 8380 (3) (b); (c), (d) (Williams 1934).
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representation, but there was nothing to indicate that the mother in-
tended by her statement to cause the son not to make a will, that he
failed to make a will because of it or that, if he had made a will, his
wife would have been sole beneficiary.
It seems foolish in this day and age that the character of the as-
sets should determine the recipients of an estate. Why, when there
are no children, should the wife get all the personalty but only dower
in the real estate? There were valid reasons for these rules in feudal
days but they have long since disappeared. 21
Partial Intestacy:
In Pinkerton v. Turman, the testator left the income from his
estate to his wife for life with authority in the executor to sell the
assets as needed for her support. The will provided for the payment,
upon her death, of three general legacies totaling $4,000. The residuary
estate was in excess of $50,000. Thus there was a substantial intestacy
following the wife's life estate. The widow failed to elect to take
against the will. Did she thereby forfeit her right to share in the
intestate property? The court held she did .but the result seems
unduly harsh.
Where a will disposes of only a part of an estate owner's property,
his state of mind, assuming the event is not accidental, is that, other
than for the property specifically given away, he is willing for the
distribution to take place according to law. It may be assumed that
he supposes his wife, along with his children, constitute the pre-
ferred group. Presumably he does not expect the law to work any
injustice. Thus he may desire that his widow be given the family
residence and his sons Blackacre. Other than that, he is willing to
let the law divide his estate. Would he not be shocked to learn that
if his widow accepts the residence, she thereby forfeits her statutory
share in the property he failed to devise or bequeath?
Tennessee is not alone in holding that a widow who takes under a
will is not permitted to share in intestate property even though if
she elects to defeat the will she gets her full intestate share. These
cases and the Tennessee holding that a spouse who takes under a will
is deprived of her intestate share are, it is submitted, based on a too
literal reading of the election statute and run counter to the statute
of distributions which covers all cases of intestacy-both total and
partial. It is believed that the rule laid down by the court will work
an injustice in the majority of cases.2
Legatees other than spouses share in intestate property even where
such a result defeats the apparent intention of the testator. In another
21. For a further criticism see Bowe, Wills, Estates and Trusts, 6 VAND. L.
REV. 1126, 1128 (1953).
22. 268 S.W.2d 347 (Tenn. 1954).
23. For a further criticism see AT=NsoN, WiLs 123 (1953).
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case24 decided this year the testatrix devised the east one-third of
Blackacre to her son A for life, remainder to the heirs of his body; the
west one-third to her son B for life, remainder to the heirs of his
body; the middle one-third to C for life, and upon C's death the
east one-half of the middle third to A for life, remainder to the heirs
of his body; the west half of the middle one-third to B for life, re-
mainder to the heirs of his body. C died before the testatrix. On A's
later death without issue A's wife was held entitled to a one-half
interest in the fee of the east one-half of Blackacre under A's will
devising his entire estate to her.
Evidence made it clear that the testatrix intended the property to
go ultimately to the issue of A and B, that she merely tolerated A's
wife and intended that she should not share in her estate. While the
general rule is that a testator is presumed to dispose of his entire
estate by his will, the court refused to imply a gift over in-this case
because of the absence of any language upon which such a construction
-could be based. A had a life estate and the heirs of his body a
contingent remainder. There being no residuary clause the possibility
of reverter in the east half passed by the law of descent to A and as
A died without children his residuary interest in the east one-half of
Blackacre passed under his will.
TRUSTS
Administration:
In the widely publicized Harvey-Cain Sloan litigation 5 involving
the real estate occupied by the Harvey Department Store, the Supreme
Court enunicated two principles affecting trust law in Tennessee which
it is hoped will be only narrowly applied.
Stripping the situation to its barest essentials the trustees executed,
subject to court approval, a twenty-five (25) year lease on a large
parcel of real estate situated in the heart of Nashville's business sec-
tion to the Cain Sloan Company a competitor of the then tenant,
Harvey. As the trust was to terminate upon the death of a life tenant
the lease obviously might extend beyond the actual or probable dura-
tion of the trust. Court approval was sought because it was not clear
whether the trustees had implied authority validly to bind the prop-
erty beyond the duration of the trust and, if so, for what period. At
this juncture, Harvey made a proposal to execute a lease which
offered a larger probable return and which the court later found was,
in its opinion, the superior lease. The court (1) determined the
trustees were without power, in the absence of court approval,
to lease beyond the duration of the trust; and (2) ordered the trustees
to execute the Harvey lease which in its judgment was superior.
24. Bedford v. Bedford, 274 S.W.2d 528 (Tenn. App. W. S. 1954).
25. Nashville Trust Co. v. Lebeck, 270 S.W.2d 470 (Tenn. 1954).
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Originally, a trustee had no implied power to sell trust assets.26 This
early rule existed because it was believed by courts to represent the
intention of most settlors. But such a rule was and is at obvious odds
with modern day investment policies and practices. And so for many
years courts have been implying a power of sale upon the flimsiest
pretext. Today it may be safely said that in the absence of a mani-
festation to the contrary a trustee has an implied power to sell trust
assets.27 Ordinarily, a trustee may not bind a remainderman by a
lease beyond the duration of the trust unless specifically authorized.
Again, this rule was based upon a presumed intent. But with the ad-
vent of long-term leases on commercial properties any such pre-
sumed intent becomes absurd if the property is commercially valuable
since no substantial tenant can be found who would consider a short-
term lease or one of uncertain duration. Such facts ought to be
sufficient to warrant a court in implying an authority to lease be-
yond the term of the trust wherever necessary, as will almost always
be true, to accomplish the purposes of the settlor.
The second principle is the more troublesome and if applied gen-
erally will represent a basic and fundamental departure from trust law
as heretofore understood. Courts do not and should not substitute
their judgment for the judgment of the trustees in matters wherein the
trustees are given a discretionary choice. In a leading Connecticut
case28 the corporate trustee wanted to invest the trust funds in
bonds-the individual trustee in stock. Being unable to agree they
sought the aid of the court. The court properly refused to decide
the dispute pointing out that the settlor had selected the trustees
because he desired their judgment; he did not desire the judgment of
the court. Of course, the court ought to use its power to prevent
a trustee from abusing his discretion or acting outside his authority,
but the court ought not to substitute its judgment for the judgment
of a trustee. In the Harvey case it is submitted that what the
court should have done, if it decided, as it did, that there was no
authority to lease for the twenty-five year period, was then to have
determined whether the particular lease submitted for approval by
the trustees was in the best interest of the beneficiaries. If not, as it
found, it should have refused to authorize its execution. But to go
further and direct the trustees to execute another and different
lease which the trustees in their judgment had determined ought
not to be executed seems a usurpation of power never conferred on
the court. If the settlor had wanted the court's judgment he should
have conferred the power of decision on the court. But he wanted
the judgment of his trustees; that is why he selected them.
26. ScOTT, TRUSTS § 190 (1939).
27. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 190 (1935).
28. McCarthy v. Tierney, 116 Conn. 588, 165 AtI. 807 (1933).
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Does the rationale of the Harvey case mean that, if a trustee is
trying to decide between General Motors and Chrysler as an invest-
ment, he may toss his problem in the lap of the court? If so, our
courts will be busy and settlors, wary of the business acumen of
judges, may well cease to create trusts. Because action beyond the
terms of the trust is to be authorized, it should not follow that the
court is permitted to exercise its business judgment in preference
to the judgment of the trustees. The writer saw a trust many years
ago which authorized the trustee to invest only in municipal bonds
paying at least four per cent. The trustee obviously required court
authority to depart from the terms of this instrument. Just as ob-
viously the court should grant such a departure. But would or should
the court then determine the particular securities in which the fund
was to be invested? The question would seem to answer itself.
Laches:
Contrary to the law of most jurisdictions oral trusts of real property
may be established by parol proof in Tennessee but the proof must
be "clear, cogent and convincing."2 9 The children in Askew v. Mills-3
conveyed the fee to certain real property to their mother with the
understanding that she was to have only a life estate. With the
knowledge and tacit approval of the children the mother expended
part of the principal. The court properly held that any claim the
children might have had for breach of trust against the mother's
executor was barred by laches. For another informal trust case in-
volving a father and son, where the son's failure promptly to insist




The Uniform Principal and Income Act was adopted by the 1955
Legislature.32 The act provides rules for the apportionment of re-
ceipts and the allocation of expenditures between life tenant and
remainderman. It clarifies a number of situations on which there
was little or no case law. For example, we have no law on the
allocation of the proceeds of a long delayed sale of unproductive prop-
erty. The primary importance of the new act, however, lies in the
fact that it changes the rule in the Tyne stock dividend decision.3
In Tyne the court had held that stock dividends were income rather
than principal and belonged to the life tenant, at least to the extent
29. Bowe, Wills, Estates and Trusts-1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 VAm. L.
REV. 975, 982 (1954).
30. 268 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. 1954).
31. 269 S.W.2d 602 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954).
32. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1955, c. 81.
33. Nashville Trust Co. v. Tyne, 250 S.W.2d 937 (Tenn. 1952). See Bowe,
supra note 21, at 1133.
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they were paid from surplus earned after the creation of the estate.
This result ran counter to the rule in practically all jurisdictions and
was generally regarded as unsound. But the court felt that being
a rule of property and having been the case law of Tennessee for
more than fifty years, any change should be made by the legislature.
The difficulty with the result of the Tyne holding was that too much
turned on the form of a stock distribution. A stock split and a stock
dividend have much the same 'economic effect to the stockholder.
Whether National Life splits its stock two for one or declares a 100 per
cent stock dividend makes little difference to the shareholder. In
either case if the shares were selling for $80, they will sell for $40.
He is better off in both cases because a wider market has been
created for his stock. Either action suggests equally well that the
company is prospering. To lawyers and accountants the techniques
are, of course, different. The dividend method requires moving sur-
plus to capital; the split leaves surplus untouched. But these are
technical changes that rarely affect the value of the stock. The
evil of the Tyne rule was that it left in the hands of the directors
of a corporation, consciously or unconsciously, the decision to enrich
either the life tenant or the remainderman where there were present
and future interests in the same shares of stock. Thus the life tenant
received a substantial portion of the corporate assets if the dividend
device was used, none if the recapitalization method was adopted.
Under the new law all dividends in stock of the declaring company
are capital. Grantors and testators desiring to make stock dividends
available to income beneficiaries may so provide in the instruments of
transfer. The rule of the statute operates only in the absence of a
contrary provision by the grantor or testator. Will and trust draftsmen
should consider the advisability of providing that the trustee in his
discretion may apportion stock dividends, in whole or in part, between
income and principal. Companies that make a practice of paying stock
dividends are becoming increasingly popular mediums of invest-
ment, because of the income tax advantage inherent in the receipt
of earnings by way of stock. A rule that deprives a life tenant of such
dividends would seem to make the stock of these growth companies
improper trust investments under our prudent man statutes, absent
any authority in the trustee to apportion to income stock dividends
that represent recurrent distributions of earnings.
1162 [(VOL. 8
